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There is an increasing pressure on the fisheries to avoid bycatch and discards, recently expressed through a 
landing obligation in the new EU Common Fisheries Policy. The European fishers are thus under pressure to 
fish selectively, in order to adjust the catch to the individual or collective quota combination and to 
optimise their economic outcome. The standard solution is to increase the selectivity of the gear, but we 
propose supplementing with the strategy of time-place selectivity by sharing real-time data and 
information about areas with high abundance of unwanted species and/or sizes (Hot Spots).  
Time-place regulation   
Time-place regulation has historically been used in self- and centrally regulated fisheries, and a couple of 
different types are used today. Marine Protected Areas are often established for protection of stock or 
spawning grounds of more permanent character or of reefs, sea bottom and localised eco-systems. Regular 
seasonal closures of certain areas are used generally to protect spawning species or juveniles in a certain 
period, and these closures are thus based on regular and predictable stock dynamics. Finally, in the latest 
years a measure for handling the more random stock behaviour has been developed, which is the real-time 
closure. Several countries have regulations which require the fishers to leave the fishing area if their catch 
contains more than a predefined level of bycatch, but real-time closures take this a step further and result 
in area closures for a shorter period of time (often three weeks) if too high levels of unwanted bycatch are 
registered in the area.   
Although more flexible, the fishers are generally critical of real-time closures: It can be questioned how 
representative just one haul is for deciding to close an area – maybe the next haul will show a wholly 
different catch composition? How well does a three week closure fit the dynamic of the protected stock? 
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And finally, especially for nephrops trawl fishery, there seems to be situations where the mobile bycatch 
species are fished or scared away after a few hauls, which leaves the relatively immobile nephrops to be 
fished with low bycatch in the following hauls (Danish fisher interview). A voluntary system of real-time 
information sharing between fishers about bycatch would produce more data on hauls (addressing the first 
issue) and allow them to test the areas again after a shorter period (addressing the second issue). Such 
real-time information sharing systems will be developed below.  
Sharing information about fishing places 
Knowing where to fish or where not to fish is central to the success of the vessel and the responsible 
skipper. Information about good fishing grounds is therefore regarded as critical by the fishers. Modern 
technology like AIS (Automatic Identification System), trackers etc. helps the skippers to navigate, to track 
the fish and to communicate. But the technology also allows the skippers to keep track of each other via 
information shared in direct communication or IT-based tracking of location and speed (e.g. 
marinetraffic.com). 
The information sharing that we discuss is not as much about the good fishing place, as it is about the “bad” 
fishing place, where there is a high abundance of unwanted species or sizes. Under a closely monitored 
landing obligation, the skipper tends to flee the area if he realises that the unwanted bycatch is high and 
that he will waste the available quota on fish with a low or no market value. He will therefore not lose a 
good fishing opportunity by sharing this information with other skippers – on the contrary – he might even 
gain social capital in the relationship with those who gained from not wasting their quotas on trying out the 
“bad” place as well. Even still, sharing information with other groups implies a risk of increased competition 
from other fisher groups, harder regulations (e.g. more obligatory real-time closures), increased public 
attention etc. 
Experiences from voluntary real-time information sharing for avoidance of bycatch  
There are several examples of voluntary information sharing initiated by the fishers to avoid bycatch 
hotspots. The fundamental incentive for the fishers to engage in establishing information sharing systems 
has generally been a threat from management of reduction in the fishing opportunities if bycatch levels 
were too high. This could be by closing the target fishery when the collective bycatch quota was exhausted, 
by reducing days-at-sea or by temporarily closed areas for precautionary reasons. Of lesser importance are 
market incentives in form of eco-labels on the documented lower bycatch or social incentives. 
Technological requirements for reporting are likely not a problem in most European or North American 
fisheries today, but the institutional issues about organisation and incentives are still relevant.  
Most examples of fisher-initiated information sharing systems have been covered by observer programs in 
which the observers would gather information on catch and bycatch anyway, meaning that data collection 
could be done at hardly any extra cost. If data instead has to be collected by the skippers for the sole 
purpose of sharing information about hotspots, they should be willing not only to share information but 
also to bear the workload of collecting and sharing data. For fisheries without observer coverage (or a 
corresponding systems), the data collection is then an issue of cooperative behaviour among the common 
pool resource users.  
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The skippers´ confidence in data collection and handling is central to their volunteering in participation in 
the information sharing. In general the data collection, handling and distribution have been taken care of 
by an independent program manager and not by a public authority. The skippers and vessel owners should 
trust the program manager, as information regarding location and catch volumes and rates can be regarded 
as confidential in relation to fellow fishers or the authorities. What information should be shared with 
whom therefore has to be agreed upon in each specific case, and the independent manager should ensure 
this. In light of this, it is obvious that the fishing industry (the relevant parts) needs to be relatively well 
organised, in order to be able to organise a voluntary program, as well as the information gathering and 
sharing. As there should be a relatively high rate of participation to be able to get sufficient data to identify 
the hotspots, a strong organisation with a high level of legitimacy among the participants is important in 
securing this high level of fleet participation.  
 
Models for fishers sharing information about hotspots  
Based on the above-mentioned experiences, four models of information sharing between fishers have been 
developed. (table 1)  
Table 1: Overview of the four models for information sharing 
Model Data Participants and 
data ownership 
Communication type 
and recipient 
Outcome 
1. 
Automated 
information 
sharing  
Electronic logbook 
data by haul 
collected for control 
of quota use  
 
Data collected for- 
and owned by the 
authorities  
Authorities (or private) 
information manager 
produces hotspot 
maps with logbook 
data:  
- public good, available 
for all  
- or for skippers only 
Hotspot maps  
- indicating critical 
areas  
- possibly also 
detailed bycatch 
data  
2.  
Semi-
automated 
information 
sharing 
Electronic logbook 
data 
Plus additional 
necessary data on 
catch area etc. 
collected specifically 
for this purpose 
Skippers willing to 
participate  
Data owned 
within the group  
An information 
manager produces 
hotspot maps for 
participating skippers 
Skippers can decide if 
they want the 
information shared 
with third parties 
Hotspot maps 
- indicating critical 
areas  
- possibly also 
detailed bycatch 
data 
3. 
Organised 
information 
sharing 
Bycatch 
observations 
described in 
predefined codes 
Codes are defined 
within the group 
Skippers willing to 
participate 
Information 
owned within the 
group 
Direct communication 
via facebook/cell 
phone chains etc.  
Skippers can decide if 
they want the 
information shared 
with third parties 
Systematic warnings 
about hotspot areas 
4. 
Informal 
information 
sharing 
Direct skipper 
observations in local 
codes/anecdotal  
Skippers within a 
“kinship” group 
Data owned 
within the group 
Direct communication 
via mobile phones, 
facebook, quay-talk, 
radio 
Anecdotal warnings 
about hotspots 
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We depart from a situation of strong incentives to avoid the unwanted bycatch, (in the EU because of the 
landing obligation and, (assuming) a relatively strong enforcement hereof) and therefore to share 
information about hotspots. Furthermore, the models presuppose availability of affordable communication 
technology and network coverage. In other regards, the models can be seen as generic. The models differ 
in the way information regarding bycatch is collected and distributed, ownership of the information, type of 
information about the hotspots and incentives to participate.  
Conclusion 
With increasing public focus on avoiding discards, the fishers can no longer use this as a tool to adjust their 
actual catch according to the available quotas/legal landings. To get the best economic outcome with the 
available quotas, they therefore have to be highly selective in their fishing activities. As a supplement to 
selective gear, we have discussed four models of how fishers can share information about hotspots – areas 
with high abundance of unwanted species and sizes.  
The models represent qualitatively different ways of collecting and sharing the information. Still there are a 
number of technical and organisational questions to be answered; how to interpret catch data and define 
hotspots? Are there legal obstacles for using data collected for quota control for maps? How should the 
administration be organised and financed? Etc. 
Nevertheless, the central issue is whether the incentives are strong enough for the individual fisher to make 
the effort to collect and send data for maps or to warn fellow fishers about experienced hotspots. This can 
only be determined in the specific case; the weight and character of the regulative pressure for selectivity, 
the specific characteristics and behaviour of the target and bycatch species, the skippers´ assessment of the 
value of the hotspot maps/warnings for their planning of fishing activity, the level of trust between the 
participating vessels and groups etc.  
We offer the models as a point of departure for discussions among fishers (and researchers) about how to 
handle the pressure of reduced or banned discarding and still maintain economically sustainable fisheries. 
As such we will initiate a discussion among fisher representatives of Skagerrak and Kattegat in 2014 and 
invite to open discussions among other groups of fishers.   
The work is a result of the INTERREG 4 project ØBJ FISK (contract number 167206). Findings are discussed 
with project partners as well as managers and fishers around the Skagerrak and Kattegat. The authors 
though bear the full responsibility for the abstract.  
 
